The post read:

In the Huliaipole sector, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are facing an impending catastrophe, according to Armed Forces military correspondent Bogdan Miroshnikov:

“Spokespeople are saying one thing, but the commander-in-chief only acknowledges three lost settlements (in reality there are more),” he reports.

After Huliaipole, it will be Orikhiv. And then, apart from Kamiševacha and Stepnohors’k, practically nothing will stop the enemy from approaching the southern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia. This will also affect the village of Pokrovske. If the enemy takes it, they will be able to reach Volnyansk. And this will represent operational-tactical successes for the enemy and a real catastrophe,” Miroshnikov believes

To understand it, I first have to find Huliaipole and then Orikhiv. It turns out that Huliaipole is a settlement about 5-10km from the “front line” and likewise Orikhiv, to the east of the once massive Zaporizhzhia “lake” the dam of which was blown up by the Ukrainians (properly known as Kakhovka Reservoir on the Dnieper river).

Whilst the comment sounds as if something dramatic is happening, from my viewpoint all I’ve noticed is a small creeping forward of the Russian held territory especially up the once eastern shore of the lake.

In other words, I have seen AREAS being taken, whereas the post talks about a lot of settlements. Which is right? Are the Russians taking areas of land, or are they taking settlements?

And, when I say “taking” what exactly does that mean? One account suggested that an “area” perhaps part of a settlement consisting of a few roads, had been “taken” by three soldiers, and that they were opposed by a similar number. Yet they were supported by dozens of drone operators as well as logistics and everyone else involved in providing those logistics.

That is very different from WWI trench warfare, even if we have regularly seen images of trenches. And, it is very different from the WWII movies we see, such as the desert rats which again had huge numbers “on the ground”.

Today, those “fighting” are likely to be at least 1km behind the “fight” and often as much as 10km. That used to be true of artillery of old, but now the drone effectively brings the artillery into the battle field with each person operating each “shell” with a screen showing exactly where they are taking it. Indeed, the Russians often boast that they check out their targets to ensure they are not inadvertently hitting civilians.

What is a “Front line”?

The line I see on a map, is the change from the area where only Russians are seen holding territory, through an area of uncertain tenancy to one where only Ukrainians are seen holding territory. That transition is usually shown as an abrupt one, although realistically, each area of up to several kilometres square is only marked one or other way due to a single piece of evidence in that area. So there could easily be half a kilometre error in open ground, perhaps less in settlements where the evidence of activity is more dense.

But, now, rather than the conflict zone between individual soldiers being as far a person can see and a gun fire, that conflict zone has extended as far as a drone can fly … and given signal jamming technology, that has now become as far as a fly-by-wire drone can fly. I am guessing the maximum range of such a drone is between 1 to 5km and perhaps more.

And, whatever that range is now, is now a death zone, in which any movement in the open is now highly risky. As such the number of soldiers in this zone has been dropping, and as numbers have been dropping the “porosity” of the “front” has been increasing as there are fewer and fewer people along the “front”.

Instead (as always) the real front line is a complex series of layers of various types extending for miles, or if we include logistics for hundreds of miles behind the “front line”.

So what does it mean when the “front line moves”?

Impending Catastrophe?

So, I also look at the phrase “Impending Catastrophe” unable to see that, yet knowing that hidden from view, such things can and do occur.

I would suggest it means: “the network of support for those at the front collapses”. And, when that occurs, those few on the “front line” cannot resist and either fall back or are killed. Yet this is not the “catastrophe” of mass slaughter that was seen in WWI where half a million might die in a single battle. Yet the Ukrainians are still dying in large numbers holding unholdable positions.

Settlements

The other thing worthy of note, is that the war is being described in terms of settlements held and taken. Yet is this just because it is convenient to use these easily identified locations, or because these locations where there are buildings are the only important aspect of the battle?

I’ve long struggled to understand the military importance of buildings, especially in a war where buildings seem to be very easy to destroy. So, surely hiding in a building, being so obvious a place to hide, is just making it easier to hit those hiding? One problem is that many settlements continue to have civilians. Another advantage seems to be “high rise” buildings, presumably because they give a unique advantage in terms of being able to see the area around. Another advantage is that settlements provide a rabbit warren of places to hide, even after buildings have been hit. Another advantage is that any building provides some shelter from the wind and therefore rain and also some screening from drones. The other advantage is infrastructure such as roads and possibly water and even electricity.

None of this is unique to settlements. Hills provide viewpoints, caves and rocks provide cover. Trees likewise. It isn’t that the country has none of these features, instead it is that settlements have them at a far greater density.

Distorted Topology

Some ground is easy to take … and thus progress is measured in perhaps km. Other ground like settlements is difficult to take and progress may be measured in 100s or even 10s of metres. If we were to construct a map where equal units of progress were the same length on the map, the outcome would be a map that is very distorted. The flat areas of country would have dimple or hills (whichever way they distort) for the buildings, and where there are settlements the distortion would be such that they cause vertical edged hills erupting from the map.

No doubt the real topology is far more complicated than this as rivers, forests, hills, roads and other features all add their distortions.  So, with such a complex topology to the “standard unit of progress” map, how can I know whether progress is “good” or “bad”? And therefore I have no idea whether the progress for one side is a “disaster” or not.

Distorted timescales

By the time the map shows movement, the battle was lost long before. Because much of the battle is the starving of resources from the other side. Once one side has gained a position to starve the other of resources, the outcome appears to be decided … unless that stranglehold can be broken. So, it is now possible to win a battle before there is any change in the front line. That is because one side may be able to use the territory it holds to wage such a war, that the other side cannot supply the territory it holds and thus defeat is inevitable.

So, movement on the map may be created by events that occurred many months before, and those events are usually not publicised. So, someone like me is left guessing what has actually, at some time in the past, led to the current changes.

And indeed, for those on the ground who can see the inevitability of the current situation and thus its outcome, they can see what will happen. So they have far more knowledge of the events that led to the current situation and much more appreciation of where events are now leading.

Pockets

The main feature of the current front line is a series of “pockets” where the line is sweeping past certain large settlements keeping about 10km away. I presume that is the limit to effective drone operation, but it might also apply to guns or even lightning raids by troops. The pockets hold out but the land around them can be taken, and then as the pocket envelopes the “defensive position” at the centre, it begins to collapse. At least that’s my understanding. In order to create these pockets, the Russians must have vastly superior logistics (which is no surprise). Those logistics must be able to provide secure reliable supplies over areas of country and keep their own side pushing forward until they surround the settlements which then cannot stand because their own supplies are cut off.

I am not sure whether these shape of the front line is a calculated decision by the Russians, or just the way a steadily pushed front line now develops. However, it seems to be connected to the use of drones, even if I can’t quite understand how.

More Information

Zaporizhzhia Direction

Russian Federation Armed Forces units continue to develop their offensive in the Huliaipole region, liberating new settlements daily.

Six settlements have been liberated in just one week.

We are rapidly approaching Huliaipole.
The terrain is favourable: if it weren’t for the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ fortifications, drones could clear the road to the Dnieper River.
But the enemy is mining the approaches and thwarting our advance in every way;

In the area near Huliaipole, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have established two defensive lines: the first consists of parallel concrete lines and an anti-tank ditch, extending from Okhotnyche to the eastern part of Yablokove; the second, long, line extends from Novo Komar to Stepnohirsk, where paratroopers of the 7th Division are advancing toward Zaporizhia.

Both lines create further difficulties for the advance. Nevertheless, the soldiers, after liberating Novouspenivka, advanced south and cleared the forest plantations west of Poltavka, as well as reaching the eastern edge of Yablokove, where heavy fighting is now taking place.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces, realising the difficulty of their position and our control of the logistical routes supplying the enemy grouping in this sector, are forced to withdraw their forces, the “Paratrooper’s Diary” channel reports

These reports are accompanied by a map with arrows over about 3-6km of land with “uncertain” control. That suggests the “advance” was a single push of about 3-6km and is now about 6km from Huliaipole.

I can only find one name on the defensive line which is about 6km east of Huliapole but I assume the line extends N-S. It is interesting that the lines are for vehicles, which tells us that the advance itself is reliant on either tanks or armoured personal carriers.

Conclusion

I’m going to call this section a “Conclusion”, not because I have a conclusion, but because I can’t keep waffling forever.

What is worth saying is that this offensive is parallel to the “front line”. Indeed, it is possible that most advances are now parallel to the front. This is also part of the “break through and encircle” strategy of the Russians. Indeed, the “pockets” may not be formed as pockets, but instead where the advance parallel to the front line finds resistance and then the advance from one side stalls, whilst a new advance starts on the far side thus enveloping the settlement.

It is also worth saying that as soon as I think I know what the Russians are doing, they start doing things differently. They are not stuck in their ways, they are clearly highly adaptable.

Addendum – small units and porous lines

This is a very good description of the way operations are now being conducted:

Russian assault pairs/trios/fives infiltrated (seeped, soaked, penetrated) into the urban area of the agglomeration (primarily into Pokrovsk through industrial zones and private sectors) and [caused chaos in] the Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison. Strongpoints in high-rise buildings pinned down FPV and harassing fire, directed aviation and artillery, flanked, leaving “for dessert.” Pokrovsk was divided into sectors, advancing quarter by quarter with assault groups along parallel streets with mutual support, which allowed avoiding “bags” and ambushes. The enemy was ready to fight and did fight, but was not prepared to fight in chaos without connection to the “mainland” for more than a week without ammo, water, food, rotation, or evacuation. The enemy faltered.

First, is the incredibly small size of the units with units of 2 and 3 being common. Next they do not “attack” but “soak” into the line. In other words, they go into the voids that are not otherwise filled by the few Ukrainians. They then take various “strongpoints” such as high rise buildings where they:

pinned down FPV [applied to drones?] and harassing fire, directed aviation and artillery, flanked, leaving [the area as ] “dessert.”

I think this means they pin down drone operators, cover the area with fire to make movement difficult and direct aviation and artillery attacks. It sounds as if these groups, rather than “taking over” instead “force out” the small units of Ukrainians. So, the “front line” isn’t a line of “contact” but instead a “desert”.

Interestingly they still advance along roads. Why a simple garden fence still acts to deter movement is crazy, yet, it is easier to advance along a road than across gardens or the equivalent. This may be because there are fewer places to hide at the front of buildings than either behind or amongst.

It is also clear that the Pokrosk encirclement is real and strangling the Ukrainian defence.

It goes on to say

In conditions of a “layered cake,” war of all against all, absence of rear and flanks, the defence of the cities lost order and discipline, was disorganised and fell. Russian special forces groups organised friendly fire among Ukrainian units,

I presume this means that whilst there are “layers” the layers are such that they are all fighting the same battles and even that everything is now mixed up … which fits with the “friendly fire” incidents being created.

Taking advantage of the RUSSIAN FOG that pinned down the Ukrainian “small aviation” here, we introduced new forces into the city, while the enemy cowered in basements, freezing and suffering shortages. The enemy had no initiative, and this became the key to the results of the battles for Pokrovsk.

I think the fog is smoke being generated. Which I would suggest also implies that the US are actively engaged in monitoring battles from the air. However it may also be the “Small aviation” which must be drones. Either way, once the air support is neutralised, the Ukrainians are so disorganised that they begin firing on their own units. They then seek shelter … presumably because the Russian drone attacks force that action, and whilst they shelter the Russians introduce new forces.

I would suggest the war is being fought through the constant taking of positions by very small units who then dominate the area around and force out the Ukrainian, which then allows more such units to occupy more positions.

A completely new tactic applied by the Russians, operating in the streets and industrial zone without tanks and armoured vehicles but supported by FAB with UMPK, FPV, adjusting artillery and MLRS fire, allowed pushing the demoralised enemy out of Pokrovsk.

The key here is that urban warfare used to rely heavily on the use of tanks, because the tanks were needed to clear enemy positions that were behind solid walls and which could not be approached. But now with drones and precision artillery the tanks appear not to be needed.